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THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN VERSUS THE RIGHT TO 
DISCLOSURE OF GAMETE DONORS’ ID: ETHICAL AND LEGAL 
CONSIDERATIONS
Mónica Correia1, Guilhermina Rego2, Rui Nunes3
Abstract: The anonymity of gamete donors in the context of medically-assisted reproduction techniques (ART) and the right 
of the offspring to know their genetic or biological parents’ identity is a controversial and widely debated topic in the scien-
tific literature. The positions on the issue in each country are different. Sometimes they are in opposition to each other even 
in countries with strong similarities, such as those in the European Union (EU), in the framework of shared ethical values. 
Although some countries still enshrine the rule of anonymity, there is an undeniable tendency to guarantee the right to know 
one’s origins by creating relevant exceptions or abolishing donor anonymity status altogether. This article offers ethical and 
legal considerations of whether the so-called ‘right to be forgotten’ (RTBF) could be extended to include gamete donors’ right 
to remain anonymous. This perspective goes against the general trend, certainly in Europe, of recognizing that offspring born 
from donor gametes have a right to access information relating to their genetic progenitors. The novel addition is to question 
whether the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) might provide fertile ground for questioning this approach, and 
effectively support those jurisdictions where anonymity is still possible.
Keywords: anonymity, disclosure, ethics, gamete donation, privacy, ‘right to be forgotten’
El derecho al olvido frente al derecho a revelar la identificación de los donantes de gametos: consideraciones éticas y 
jurídicas
Resumen: El anonimato de los donantes de gametos en el contexto de las técnicas de reproducción médicamente asistida (RM) 
y el derecho de la descendencia a conocer su identidad genética o biológica es un tema controvertido y ampliamente debatido en 
la literatura científica. Las posiciones sobre el tema en cada país son diferentes. A veces se oponen entre sí, incluso en países con 
fuertes similitudes, como los de la Unión Europea (UE), en el marco de valores éticos compartidos. Aunque algunos países siguen 
consagrando la norma del anonimato, es innegable la tendencia a garantizar el derecho a conocer el propio origen creando las 
excepciones pertinentes o suprimiendo por completo el estatus de anonimato del donante. Este artículo ofrece consideraciones 
éticas y jurídicas sobre si el llamado “derecho al olvido” podría ampliarse para incluir el derecho de los donantes de gametos a 
permanecer en el anonimato. Esta opinión es contraria a la tendencia general, ciertamente en Europa, de reconocer que los hijos 
nacidos de gametos donados tienen derecho a acceder a la información relativa a sus padres genéticos. La nueva adición consiste 
en debatir si el Reglamento general de protección de datos (RGPD) podría proporcionar un terreno fértil para cuestionar este 
enfoque y apoyar efectivamente a las jurisdicciones en las que el anonimato sigue siendo posible.
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O Direito ao Esquecimento versus o Direito à Divulgação da Identificação de Dadores de Gâmetas: Considerações 
Éticas e Legais
Resumo: O anonimato dos dadores de gâmetas no contexto das técnicas de reprodução medicamente assistida (RMA) e o 
direito da descendência a conhecer a sua identidade genética ou biológica é um tema controverso e amplamente debatido na 
literatura científica. As posições sobre a questão em cada país são diferentes. Por vezes estão em oposição umas às outras, mesmo 
em países com fortes semelhanças, como os da União Europeia (UE), no quadro de valores éticos partilhados. Embora alguns 
países ainda consagrem a regra do anonimato, existe uma tendência inegável para garantir o direito de conhecer as suas origens, 
criando exceções relevantes ou abolindo completamente o estatuto de anonimato dos dadores. Este artigo oferece considera-
ções éticas e legais sobre se o chamado “direito ao esquecimento” poderia ser alargado para incluir o direito dos dadores de 
gâmetas a permanecerem anónimos. Esta perspetiva vai contra a tendência geral, certamente na Europa, de reconhecer que os 
descendentes nascidos de gâmetas doadas têm o direito de aceder à informação relacionada com os seus progenitores genéticos. 
O novo aditamento é debater se o Regulamento Geral de Proteção de Dados (RGPD) poderá fornecer um terreno fértil para 
questionar esta abordagem, e apoiar efetivamente as jurisdições onde o anonimato ainda é possível.
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International framework for ART using gam-
ete donation
In the last two decades in democratic countries, 
there has been a general trend towards the recog-
nition of the rights of people born through ART 
with genetic material from donors to learn their 
origins. Thus, the anonymity of gamete donors is 
no longer a unanimous rule at an international 
level. Sweden was a pioneer in Europe in abol-
ishing the principle of anonymity for gamete 
donations(10,18), and several countries followed 
this position: Austria, Switzerland(19), the Neth-
erlands(20), the United Kingdom(21), and Ger-
many, Finland, and Iceland(2). Recently, Portu-
gal followed these countries since the Portuguese 
Constitutional Court considered the law that set-
tled anonymous donations unconstitutional(22). 
Consequently, the law changed in Portugal, and 
the right of access to genetic origins was ap-
proved(2,23). 
Therefore, the tendency to give priority to the 
rights of persons conceived via donations of ge-
netic material to learn their origins is increas-
ing, and a position in favor of the prohibition 
of anonymity of gamete donors is growing. This 
knowledge is indeed recommended by the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe: “6. 
The Assembly invites the Committee of Minis-
ters to deliberate on whether these recommenda-
tions should ultimately become legally binding. 
7. Whichever form the recommendations take, 
the Assembly advises that they are built on the 
following principles: 7.1. Anonymity should be 
waived for all future gamete donations in Council 
of Europe member States, and the use of anony-
mously donated sperm and oocytes should be 
prohibited.” However, the option for confidenti-
ality persists in some European countries, namely 
in Spain and France(22). It should also be noted 
that the United Kingdom by abandoning the op-
tion of absolute anonymity, has safeguarded the 
expectations of donors who donated gametes 
prior to the amendment of the law that does not 
expressly exempt anonymity(24). For this group 
of subjects, the rule of confidentiality with respect 
to their identity remains(21). 
In Australia, anonymity was abolished(13,25), 
and there is some empirical evidence that recom-
Introduction
The anonymity of gamete donors in the context 
of medically-assisted reproduction techniques 
(ART) and the right of the offspring to know the 
identity of their genetic or biological parents is a 
controversial and widely debated topic in the sci-
entific literature(1-17). The positions on the issue 
in each country are different. Sometimes they are 
in opposition to each other even in countries with 
strong similarities, such as those in the European 
Union (EU), in the framework of shared ethical 
values. Although some countries still enshrine the 
rule of anonymity, there is an undeniable ten-
dency to guarantee the right to know one’s ori-
gins by creating relevant exceptions or abolishing 
donor anonymity status altogether. Those advo-
cating access to donor identification argue that 
anonymity violates fundamental rights, such as 
the right to personal identity, free development 
of personality, historicity, and the right to know 
the donor’s genetic background. On the contrary, 
defenders of anonymity stress that the desire to 
understand the genetic origins of offspring fol-
lowing the use of ART techniques using donors 
may conflict with other interests, such as main-
taining peace and stability within the family in 
which they are currently integrated in addition to 
preserving privacy rights of those who have do-
nated genetic material(1-17).
In this article, we take an ethical and legal ap-
proach to address medically-assisted reproduction 
techniques using donors by taking into account 
a recently enshrined right in Europe with global 
influence: the so-called ‘right to be forgotten’ 
(RTBF) or deletion of personal data. This new 
law cannot undermine the right to know genetic 
heritage; nonetheless, if admitted, the law might 
grant an advanced means of ensuring anonym-
ity to gamete donors. Therefore, in this article we 
will revisit the debate bearing in mind the ethi-
cal and legal impact of the RTBF. We argue that 
possible claims of the right to delete data add a 
heated discussion in favor of non-disclosure of 
identifying information of gamete donors despite 
the opposite international trend towards the right 
to disclosure.
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who biologically determined his/her existence. 
The protection of personality requires that the 
law protect the right to truth and the right to 
knowledge of genetic origins so that ultimately 
personal identity and autonomy of the human 
being are preserved(34,35).
The disclosure perspective also highlights that 
anonymity violates human dignity and equal-
ity among human beings since there are persons 
who can know their identity and others who can-
not(11,34). Also, the disclosure advocates stress 
the large body of literature which demonstrates 
that many donor-conceived people are very inter-
ested in finding donor siblings(24).
Although rights to personal identity and free 
personality development have great relevance 
in establishing legal parentage(36), they do not 
necessarily support it in all cases. Thus, a current 
line of thought that has been gaining momentum 
argues that knowledge of fatherhood (or biologi-
cal motherhood) through scientific evidence is 
relevant only out of respect for the fundamental 
right of personality development, yet is not suffi-
cient to support the establishment of legal parent-
age since it is essentially an affective and cultural 
fact(36). Indeed, despite the tendency to consider 
the prohibition of anonymity mentioned above, 
as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe points out: “the waiving of anonymity 
should have no legal consequences for filiation: 
the donor should be protected from any request 
to determine parentage or an inheritance or par-
enting claim.” As so, parentage founded on will 
weakens the principle of biological truth, which 
used to be the rule to establish parentage. This 
concept is the case in Brazilian law, for example. 
In Brazil, the idea that knowledge of biological fa-
therhood or of genetic origin satisfies a fundamen-
tal right in the field of personality development 
has gained strength, but it does not reflect true 
parentage, which is an educational and emotional 
circumstance(36). In the European Union con-
text, the recommendation is for the law to follow 
this trend (non-existence of a legal relationship 
among the offspring in the case of ART using ge-
netic material from donors). Perhaps the removal 
of biological truth to establish legal bonds, in this 
case, shows a tendency towards greater protec-
tion to affective ties rather than towards biologi-
mends open-identity systems as a policy to be de-
veloped(26,27). New Zealand followed the same 
path(28,29). 
In the United States, no federal or state regula-
tion exists; so much of the matter is self-regulated 
by non-compulsory guidelines used in the gamete 
donor business(18,30).
Gamete donors’ identity disclosure or non-dis-
closure: the debate revisited
The international trend towards disclosure of 
identifying donor information relies mostly on 
the growing importance given to the rights of 
children. In fact, article 7(1) of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child(31) stipulates: “The 
child shall be registered immediately after birth 
and shall have the right from birth to a name, the 
right to acquire a nationality and, as far as pos-
sible, the right to know and be cared for by his or 
her parents.” 
At the time the rule was written, gamete dona-
tion was not considered, and the rule has been in-
creasingly interpreted as the child’s basic human 
right to know their genetic or biological back-
ground(19,32). In countries in which non-ano-
nymity is binding, this right is established both 
prospectively and retroactively(11), which means 
it is a right at birth, but it can only be applied 
once the child is mature, which normally occurs 
when he/she reaches the age of the majority.
The advocates of this right stress that it encom-
passes the rights to personal identity, to free per-
sonality development, and to historicity. Personal 
identity is the feature that characterizes each per-
son as an individual entity and differentiates him/
her from all other people because of certain per-
sonal experiences(33). In a very broad sense, the 
right to personal identity encompasses the right 
of each person to live in agreement with him or 
herself and is ultimately an expression of the free-
dom of conscience projected externally in certain 
life choices. According to Vergallo, Marinelli(34) 
the right to personal identity postulates a princi-
ple of personal truth. The right to identity shall 
cover personal historicity with the holder being 
entitled to knowledge of the circumstances in 
which he/she was conceived and of the persons 
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disclosure of genetic identity(4) as long as it does 
not refer to a concrete identified or identifiable 
subject.
Another powerful argument concerning the ano-
nymity perspective is that defence of data iden-
tification disclosure gives excessive meaning to 
genes in personality and identity development. 
This line of thought argues that genes are over-
rated, which increases concerns about genetic de-
terminism or essentialism(41), an idea that pro-
poses that the human being consists entirely of 
genes and whose conduct is foreseeable founded 
on genetic information(12). Recently this idea is 
being questioned by epigenetics that gives due 
consideration to the psychological effects of preg-
nancy and the closeness of the pregnant woman’s 
partner throughout the ART and pregnancy pro-
cess(42,43).
That said another important dispute compares 
the anonymity issue with adoption(37). In fact, 
as in the case of heterologous ART, parentage in 
adoption is not biology-based. The problem of 
the right to know the identity of biological par-
ents arises then, in comparable terms, in relation 
to the two groups of subjects (adoptees and born 
by the use of gamete). In several countries, the 
adoption system guarantees the right to learn 
their origins to adoptees. As a principle, this so-
lution effectively contradicts the rules of secrecy 
(even if not absolute) about the identity of genet-
ic material donors in the cases of ART and creates 
differentiated treatment among individuals in a 
comparable position. Nevertheless, unlike those 
born because of ART, adopted individuals are 
recognized as a legal bond of natural parenthood 
later replaced by adoptive parentage, while the 
gamete donor is originally irrelevant to parent-
hood. In this perspective, this argument is cen-
tral and encompasses the fundamental difference 
in the cases under comparison(11,19,29,37). In 
fact, regarding adoption, there is the possibility of 
a period of interaction with natural parents that 
generates some memories, at least the memory of 
intrauterine life, unparalleled in the case of do-
nors in the ART process. From this angle, the 
invocation of the right to personal historicity by 
those generated through ART using donated ge-
netic material lacks sufficient weight to justify its 
protection at all costs. The same arguments stand 
cal ones. Possibly, other values subordinate this 
scope of human relations. Thus, there are those 
who argue that there are compelling reasons in 
favor of the right to anonymity(1,17,30,37,38). 
Definitely, some authors argue that confidential 
participation in ART processes is justified by the 
preservation of other values. Protecting family 
peace, privacy, and emotional ties that bind fam-
ily members is not an excessive restriction or arbi-
trary discrimination in terms of equality between 
citizens. In this view, arguing the opposing point 
diminishes these values in addition to increasing 
the risk of a significant reduction in the number 
of donors(18,30,39,40). Some authors defend 
that this opposing point of view might under-
mine the right to start a family, which is also a 
fundamental right as a manifestation of autono-
my in the sense of self-realization that is intrinsic 
to human beings and value worthy of protection. 
According to Sauer(35) these values justify a re-
gime of anonymity although this regime is not 
absolute. Indeed, wise assessment of such risks is 
contained within the margin of appreciation of 
democratic societies. The existence of a conflict 
of interest or fundamental values legitimizes the 
defence of a balanced solution(18) through the 
stipulation of a public policy of confidentiality 
regarding donor identity, which may give way 
to demonstrably ponderous cases. According to 
Frith(19), justifying reasons to disclosure might 
encompass: the need to find the donor and other 
donations avoided if the child has a hereditary 
disease; the need to learn whether there is any 
marriage impediment with the intended spouse 
in cases of inbreeding.
Nevertheless, the fundamental right to personal 
identity and personality development must be 
weighed and tends to prevail in the concrete as-
sessment of the case, especially when there is no 
opposition from the donor or when there is no 
danger of the fundamental rights of the donor 
being infringed upon by the intended disclosure. 
Consequently, as a matter of principle, the so-
lution of secrecy in the case of the use of ART 
should only exist in relation to the most relevant 
aspect, which is the need to disclose the name 
and/or address of the specific donor(5,35). We 
argue the solution should be the opposite regard-
ing the use of these techniques or concerning the 
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brella concept of “the right to know one’s genetic 
origins” in a manner that confounds the debate. 
To achieve greater conceptual clarity, some neces-
sary distinctions must be made. (…) The medical 
aspect points towards the right to know one’s full 
medical history and to know medically relevant 
genetic information about the donor. The iden-
tity aspect points towards the right to personal 
information about the donor as a person (narra-
tive information) that would assist offspring in 
overcoming identity issues. The relational aspect 
points towards the right to know the full iden-
tity of the donor in order to contact him or her 
and attempt to establish a relationship. Finally, 
the parental disclosure aspect relates to the right to 
know the truth about the circumstances of one’s 
conception as trumping parents’ right to privacy.” 
It bears emphasizing that identification is itself 
disturbing to the donor’s rights and must only 
prevail considering underlying historicity, and for 
this, a relational, social past is required. This view 
justifies the distinction from other situations in 
which a right to personal identity deserves pro-
tection in its aspect of personal history because in 
some cases, it is indispensable to such identifica-
tion —to define paternity or for adoption. This 
differentiation does not end up as a violation of 
equality. For all of these reasons, it is believed that 
the solution that imposes the obligation to iden-
tify donors in the case of ART goes far beyond 
what is necessary to fulfil the right to personal 
identity, while at the same time jeopardizes other 
fundamental rights. Moreover, promoting gam-
ete donation disclosure in the name of an exacer-
bated defence of a right to curiosity could be the 
starting point to serious consequences for donor 
rights(44,45).
The RTBF and ART using gamete donation
As discussed in the previous section, there are 
different positions regarding the right to non- or 
disclosure of donor data identification. Moreover, 
some argue that genetic testing, and data sover-
eignty end donors’ anonymity(5,10,47). Similar-
ly, we argue that data protection legislation, and 
specifically the right to the right to obtain from 
the controller the erasure of personal data, might 
hinder the application of the right to disclosure 
of donor identification in countries where this is 
out when comparing ART with investigations of 
paternity. Thus, as Clark(18) indicated in a ho-
listic approach of the problem under discussion, 
the absence of relational interaction underlying 
the ART process itself weakens the invocation of 
a common history. Consequently, the aspect of 
the right to the personal identity of the one gen-
erated via the use of ART degrades into a mere 
right to curiosity(11). If the right to curiosity in 
other fields, such as the right to know informa-
tion that respects us, is an exercise of the right to 
informational self-determination and is worthy 
of protection, it cannot simply overlap if the in-
formation in question relates not only to oneself 
but also to someone whom himself/herself has 
a history. Therefore, the damage done to donor 
rights or even to the legal parents by revealing the 
identity of the donor can lead to very negative 
consequences. Anonymity relates to donors’ right 
to self-determination with respect to information 
concerning them, to the right to the free develop-
ment of their personality, and to their own right 
to personal identity since the definition of who 
we are results both from whom we originate or do 
not originate. Above all, anonymity relates to the 
right to privacy and family life(22).
Most of the advocates of anonymity stress that 
the circumstances justifying a duty of secrecy in 
gamete donation should not be confused with 
those that are relevant to the investigation of pa-
ternity or to adoption(44,45). A different density 
of the right to historicity underlies each of these 
cases. Historicity implies a social and relational 
background. Donation does not establish this 
social relationship. Ultimately, it is a biological 
contribution based on a technique that is absent 
from social relationships. Therefore, those who 
are created do not have to know the identity of 
those who donated the gamete. It may be neces-
sary to reveal later, and if asked, the origin, the 
method of conception, genetic characteristics —
as a guarantee of the right to a genetic identity— 
particularly in order to detect inbreeding. Disclo-
sure of the genetic heritage in the sense of char-
acteristics respects the right to personal identity 
and development of personality, but then again 
there is no justification to reveal the identity of 
the donor. Therefore, Ravitsky(46) states that 
“Different claims are being made under the um-
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ler shall have the obligation to erase personal data 
without undue delay where one of the following 
grounds applies: (a) the personal data are no long-
er necessary in relation to the purposes for which 
they were collected or otherwise processed; (b) 
the data subject withdraws consent on which the 
processing is based according to point (a) of Ar-
ticle 6(1), or point (a) of Article 9(2), and where 
there is no other legal ground for the processing;”
We argue this right might be applicable to the 
case of gamete donors’ names and addresses as 
this law refers to a concrete identified or identifia-
ble subject. In addition, Recital 65 of the GDPR, 
which is the basis of Article 17 abovementioned, 
explicitly states: “A data subject should have the 
right to have his or her personal data erased and 
no longer processed where the personal data are 
no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for 
which they are collected or otherwise processed, 
where a data subject has withdrawn his or her 
consent or objects to the processing of personal 
data concerning him or her, or where the process-
ing of his or her personal data does not otherwise 
comply with the Regulation.”
At this point, the donor might claim a right to 
have his/her identity deleted as a condition of 
autonomy or informational self-determination, 
by withdrawing consent, or as an exercise of the 
right to be let alone. However, an organization’s 
right to process someone’s data might override 
their right to be forgotten. Specific reasons cited 
in Article 17 of the GDPR outdo the right to 
erasure: “(a) for exercising the right of freedom 
of expression and information; (b) for compli-
ance with a legal obligation which requires pro-
cessing by Union or Member State law to which 
the controller is subject or for the performance 
of a task carried out in the public interest or in 
the exercise of official authority vested in the con-
troller; (c)  for reasons of public interest in the 
area of public health in accordance with points 
(h) and (i) of Article 9(2) as well as Article 9(3); 
(d) for archiving purposes in the public interest, 
scientific or historical research purposes or statis-
tical purposes in accordance with Article 89(1) in 
so far as the right referred to in paragraph 1 is 
likely to render impossible or seriously impair the 
achievement of the objectives of that processing; 
or (e) for the establishment, exercise or defence 
provided by law. To help us consider whether the 
RTBF is likely to influence the international non-
anonymity trend, it is useful to understand the 
context in which this new law was shaped and to 
ask whether it might be put into practice regard-
ing artificial donor insemination.
Before the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the Council(48) —the 
so-called General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR)— there was a widespread perception 
within Europe that differences in the application 
of Directive 95/45/EC(49) —the Data Protec-
tion Directive— created legal uncertainty with 
regard to the processing of personal data be-
tween the Member States. This European legal 
instrument(48) appears as a form of regulation 
to strengthen the protection of personal data of 
citizens in equilibrium with other fundamental 
rights and in accordance with the principle of 
proportionality, taking into account the interests 
(public and private) at stake and the objectives 
of the Union. It intensifies informational self-
determination, combining the robustness of the 
data subject’s consent validity requirements with 
the establishment of new rights that allow greater 
control over these rights(50). One of these rights 
is the deletion of personal data. The origin of the 
RTBF lies in a case concerning data found in a 
Google search engine: the famous Google versus 
Spain Judgment(50-52). This trial was ground-
breaking and confirmed the idea that individuals 
should be able to manage their personal data in 
addition to their corresponding rights, including 
the right to data deletion(53). 
However, the legal wording of Article 17 of the 
GDPR(48), entitled ‘Right to erasure (‘right to 
be forgotten’)’, does not restrict it to personal data 
found on the Internet. Curiously, this law did not 
enshrine that scope of application (only databas-
es); hence, discussing its ethical and legal dimen-
sion is important since the omission of this dis-
cussion may lead to the applications of this right 
to data that are within its requirements regardless 
of file type (such as whether they are archived in 
electronic form or classic official records). Indeed, 
article 17, point 1 of the GDPR states: “The data 
subject shall have the right to obtain from the 
controller the erasure of personal data concerning 
him or her without undue delay and the control-
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it would have to contemplate how differently the 
right to be forgotten would apply to retrospective 
stripping of anonymity versus donors who con-
sented to be identified 18 years or more in the 
future. It seems that no application of the right 
to be forgotten should be granted regarding the 
latter. Therefore, withdrawing consent should be 
discussed and regulated in this case. The GDPR 
has a definite impact on a global scale(54-59). 
Indeed, while this paper presents and analyses 
medically-assisted reproduction techniques us-
ing donors by taking into account the right to 
have personal data deleted, the lack of specifics 
in the regulatory responses of ART regarding the 
right to be forgotten is relevant to many countries 
responding to the same problems. Therefore, the 
RTBF might have an essential role in the context 
of medically-assisted reproduction techniques us-
ing gamete donors, which is much more open-
ended than the purposes justifying the processing 
of their identifying data. 
The right to personal identity, free development 
personality, and historicity do not obscure the 
idea that individuals should also have rights over-
identification of their data, including the right to 
have that data erased in some cases. However, in 
this matter, there are no absolute rights because a 
necessary balance between them has to be found. 
We are convinced that the institutions of the Eu-
ropean Union have not considered the possibil-
ity of this right being invoked by gamete donors, 
but the reasons for registering their data will have 
to consider pseudonymization. We believe that 
the right to oblivion may endanger what states 
have progressively fought to safeguard in this 
growing trend towards donor identification. It 
is, then, necessary to determine whether absolute 
anonymity is ethically and legally permissible be-
cause what is to be avoided with the prospective 
and retroactive interpretation of the rights of the 
child may be rendered impossible if there is not 
the necessary ethical consideration of the effects 
of this right on such an important issue. Absolute 
anonymity seems to us to be ethically and legally 
undesirable since fundamental rights are at stake. 
In the balance of fundamental rights, the right to 
delete should only mitigate the right to privacy of 
the donor with ponderous reasons that justify the 
removal of anonymity. However, having the right 
of legal claims.” Points (a), (c) and (d) do not ap-
ply for a disclosure of donor identity. Points b) 
and c) raise doubts, as the GDPR is very explicit 
on the processing of personal data. Data process-
ing shall comply with the principle of purpose 
limitation and data minimisation. We underline 
that the rules allowing the recording of personal 
data do not necessarily imply sharing them with 
third parties. Especially when sensitive data are 
involved, such as genetic data to which the donor 
identification is linked. Moreover, the exceptions 
indicated in points (b) and (e) are unclear as to 
the preconditions for obstructing the deletion of 
data if it were to be shared with third parties.
Furthermore, even if this were a matter of public 
interest (which we find difficult to support since 
we are dealing with individual and possibly third 
party rights), still, there are specific derogations 
established in Article 89 of the GDPR. Indeed: 
“Processing for archiving purposes in the public 
interest shall be subject to appropriate safeguards 
for the rights and freedoms of the data subject. 
Those safeguards shall ensure that technical and 
organizational measures are in place in particular 
in order to ensure respect for the principle of data 
minimization. Those measures may include pseu-
donymization provided that those purposes can 
be fulfilled in that manner. Where those purposes 
can be fulfilled by further processing which does 
not permit or no longer permits the identification 
of data subjects, those purposes shall be fulfilled 
in that manner.”
Therefore, data pseudo-anonymization, i.e. data 
replaced by a code that makes re-identification 
impossible, is required.
In the case of ART using genetic material from 
donors, the combination of the RTBF, the princi-
ple of purpose limitation, and data minimization, 
might be considered ethically and legally prob-
lematic because these rules represent a means of 
supporting, in practical terms, the right to donor 
anonymity as an absolute right. Undoubtedly, 
if identifying data are missing due to deletion, 
disclosure of information becomes impossible. 
The right to be forgotten leads to complete se-
crecy regarding identifying data of the donor. Of 
course, if the GDPR were to be revised consider-
ing the regulation of reproductive technologies, 
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to delete personal data, combined with the prin-
ciple of purpose limitation, and data minimiza-
tion might hinder the application of the right to 
disclosure of donor identification in countries 
where this is provided by law. Anonymity might 
become the consequence if the right to be forgot-
ten is not adequately considered. These concerns 
highlight the importance of a wide-ranging dis-
cussion regarding the RTBF in the case of ART 
using donors. The provisions that the law adopts 
to protect conflicting personal rights of offspring 
and donors require an ethical and legal approach 
that might clarify the personal identity and per-
sonality concepts.
to know genetic heritage is not the same as having 
the right to learn the gamete donor’s name and be 
able to contact him/her.
Conclusion
The RTBF is a balancing exercise at its core, which 
means that it has to be articulated with counter-
vailing rights in a given context. Possible claims of 
a right to delete data add a significant argument 
in favour of non-disclosure of identifying gamete 
donor information despite the opposite interna-
tional trend towards the right to disclosure. Data 
protection legislation, and specifically the right 
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